Starvation in Gaza: What Israeli Mainstream Journalists Are Saying

A reflection on the Call Me Back podcast: From famine to statehood? – with Nadav Eyal and Amit Segal

In parts of the diasporic Jewish community, I encounter a persistent denialism about the current humanitarian disaster in Gaza. I often hear claims that starvation doesn't exist or is grossly exaggerated, that aid is flowing normally, and that responsibility lies only with Hamas.

This is clearly at odds with what the international media is saying but strikingly, it is also at odds with the understanding in the Israeli media. I'm using this podcast from right‑leaning pundit Dan Senor, which contains a detailed discussion, as the basis for understanding the Israeli view on the current situation. This is not international criticism; it is how mainstream Israeli analysts themselves are explaining what is happening.

What follows is my write‑up of that discussion: how aid used to be delivered, what changed with the March blockade, how the Gaza Humanitarian Fund (GHF) operates, why it has failed, and how Hamas benefits nonetheless.

⸻

1. Before March: A Fragile but Functioning Humanitarian Lifeline

Until March 2025, the humanitarian system in Gaza, though always fragile, was functioning. Each morning, a joint coordination meeting took place involving representatives from the United Nations, the World Food Programme, international NGOs, and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). At these meetings, they would plan the flow of aid — agreeing on routes, timings, and security measures. The purpose was to ensure that food, water, and medicine reached Gaza's communities directly, despite the dangers of war.

The principle was consistent with international humanitarian law: aid must be delivered into communities, not demanded from civilians under fire. Deliveries reached neighborhoods across the Strip, including vulnerable groups: the elderly, women, and children, who would never have been able to travel miles through a war zone to collect aid.

The system was imperfect. Hamas certainly interfered — taxing goods, skimming supplies, and using its role as gatekeeper to build authority. But in practice, this mechanism staved off mass starvation. People could access food in their communities. The fragile lifeline held.

⸻

2. From January to March: The Hostage Deal and the Complete Blockade

The turning point came after the January 2025 hostage release deal. Israel's far‑right coalition partners, furious at the concessions made, demanded punitive measures. In response, beginning in March, Israel imposed a complete blockade on all food and water entering Gaza.

This was not a tightening of checks; it was total. No UN convoys, no NGO trucks, no shipments of flour, rice, or clean water. For nearly three months, nothing entered. Families ran out of reserves. Aid groups warned that famine was imminent. Malnutrition appeared quickly, especially among children.

It was only after this complete shutdown that aid resumed — and when it did, it was not through the established UN and NGO channels that had proven workable, but via a new mechanism: the Gaza Humanitarian Fund (GHF). This was done against the strong advice of all humanitarian aid groups, who insisted that forcing civilians to travel in a war zone would be catastrophic. They were ignored.

⸻

3. The GHF Model: Aid Through Dangerous Hubs

The GHF established large distribution hubs on the outskirts of Gaza's major cities, away from Hamas‑controlled neighborhoods. The idea was that each Palestinian who reached a hub could collect an 18‑kilogram package, meant to feed a family for a week.

On paper, the scheme looked orderly. In practice, it has been deadly.

• Massive predawn crowds: By 4 a.m., thousands gather outside the hubs. Gates open at 5. People sprint to secure packages before supplies run out.
• Dangerous, confusing routes: Roads are poorly marked and often unprotected. People running in desperation often take wrong turns. Many stumble into IDF outposts, where soldiers — suddenly confronted with crowds charging toward them in a war zone — open fire.
• "Shooting to disperse": The IDF describes this as "shooting in order to disperse" — live fire meant to deter the crowd. They insist it is not intended to kill. But as Nadav Eyal noted, drawing on documented material he reviewed, hundreds of Palestinians have been reported killed in these incidents, with many more injured.
• A deterrent effect: Families are now too afraid to send loved ones. Parents weigh the risk: "Is sending my son for food worth the chance he will be shot?" Many decide it is not. The elderly, disabled, women, and children are effectively excluded.

In short: aid exists, but it is functionally inaccessible for many and lethally dangerous for others.

Some of those who do manage to reach the hubs return multiple times a week, reselling packages in Gaza's markets. Israeli Channel 11 reported that around half of the GHF's food — much of it funded by Israeli taxpayers — is resold at obscene prices. Those with money can eat. The poor starve.

⸻

4. Why the GHF Is Failing

The reasons for the GHF's failure, as laid out in the podcast, are structural and unavoidable:

• Unsafe Access: Civilians risk being shot simply trying to get to the hubs.
• Exclusion of the Vulnerable: Only young, fit men can realistically attempt the trek; the elderly, children, and the infirm are left behind.
• Fear as Deterrent: The risk of being killed prevents countless families from even trying.
• Market Distortion: Aid is commodified, resold at high prices, and taxed by Hamas.
• Aid Without Relief: Despite Israel covering up to half the cost of the food, hunger in Gaza is not relieved. Starvation is real.

⸻

5. How Hamas Benefits Anyway

Ironically, Hamas continues to benefit under this model:

• Taxation: Hamas taxes the resale of GHF packages in Gaza's markets.
• Narrative Power: Hamas presents Israel as directly responsible for whether Palestinians eat.
• International Optics: Images of civilians shot while running for food produce worldwide condemnation of Israel.
• Social Control: In desperate times, Hamas presents itself as the only authority providing any support, bolstering its grip.

Thus, the GHF has failed in its core aim. Rather than weakening Hamas, it has left Hamas still profiting financially and politically, while Israel takes the blame.

The main losers once again are the majority of Palestinians who are poor, vulnerable and desperate.

⸻

Conclusion: A Trap of Israel's Own Making

Listening to Nadav Eyal and Amit Segal, I think the conclusion is unavoidable: the GHF has become a trap. In halting aid and then imposing a deeply flawed mechanism against expert advice, Israel now bears responsibility for Gaza's hunger — while Hamas profits.

This is not a view from hostile international media. This is the analysis of mainstream Israeli journalists. And it directly contradicts the denialism I continue to hear in some corners of the Jewish community.

Starvation is real in Gaza. Aid exists, but only at the price of danger and death. The humanitarian principle — that aid must reach civilians where they live — has been abandoned. The result is both a moral catastrophe and a strategic failure.

⸻

Coming up next… The inevitable whataboutery and goalpost‑shifting that arises in response to not being able to challenge the facts of this article. Before you go there, spend some time thinking: what if I'm wrong?